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Poverty is present in all modern societies. Even in the richest countries in the world, few
would disagree that some individuals have unacceptably low living standards.
2 How to
address this problem, however, is still unclear. Recently, an old debate has been revived:
is the  solution to achieve economic growth, or should governments actively pursue
poverty reduction policies? There are basically two opposing views. One states that the
income of the poor grows one for one with economic growth; therefore, policies that
guarantee growth implicitly contribute to poverty reduction, and the justification for
additional social policies is unclear.
3 The other view is that the incomes of the poor grow
less than one for one with average income.
4 The poor might in fact benefit from growth,
but since the effect is rather small, growth alone will take too long to solve the
problem?if it does so at all. According to this view, in addition to growth-enhancing
policies, the State should actively pursue policies aimed at improving the well-being of
the least favored members of society.
Attanasio and  Székely (2001) argue that growth alone does not guarantee a
solution to the poverty problem, at least in Latin America. Consider the following two
examples. Between 1996 and 1998, GDP per capita increased in Mexico by 9.7 percent in
real terms, which is a spectacular gain as judged by the country’s macroeconomic
performance during the previous 16 years. However, poverty hardly declined. In fact, the
incomes of the poorest 30 percent of the population contracted during this period. The
huge increase in mean income was due entirely to income gains among the richest 30
percent?particularly the richest 10 percent?of the population.
5
The second example is Chile, which has been characterized as one of the most
successful economic growth stories in Latin America for the past decade. Between 1992
                                                       
1 The author is an  econist at the Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank
(miguels@iadb.org). This paper was prepared as a chapter for the volume Portrait of the Poor: An Asset-
Based Approach, edited by  Orazio  Attanasio and Miguel  Székely, Johns Hopkins University Press,
forthcoming, 2001. The author thanks Javier Torres for his efficient research assistance.
2 If one uses a definition of poverty of 2-dollars-a-day, the proportion of poor in most developed countries
turns out to be very small (around 2% of the total population). But this type of definition, which might be
appropriate for developing countries, is meaningless in the context of rich countries. In the developed
world, the poverty line is usually relative to the standard of living of each population. These definitions
always yield poverty rates well over the absolute poverty levels.
3 Some examples are Dollar and Kraay (2000), Gallup et al. (1999), and Roemer and Gugerty (1997).
4 See for instance, Bourguignon (2001), Birdsall and De la Torre (2001) and Foster and Székely (2001).4
and 1996, Chilean GDP per capita expanded by more than 30 percent in real terms.
During the same period, moderate poverty registered a substantial decline from 20 to 16
percent?a reduction of 20 percent in the head count ratio. But income inequality also
increased during the period (the Gini index rose by 7 percent). In fact, had the income
distribution remained the same as in 1992, the proportion of poor would have actually
declined to 10 percent, rather than 16 percent?that is, the poverty rate would have been
cut by one half, instead of by 20 percent.
6
These two examples show that growth by itself does not necessarily guarantee a
solution to the poverty problem, and that growth alone may result in much lower poverty
reduction, especially if its benefits are concentrated among the better-off sectors of the
population. They suggest that growth-enhancing policies should be given high priority,
but additionally that poverty reduction should be actively pursued through a wider set of
policies.
The objective of  Attanasio and  Székely (2001), the product of a  project
sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank, is to outline a framework for
thinking about which policies can lead to substantial poverty reduction. The introductory
chapter and the country case studies generate evidence supporting the idea that income is
just “the tip of the iceberg.” Once one goes beyond income and looks into what is behind
the process of income generation (the asset-based approach), a whole new range of
possibilities arises. The purpose of this paper is to discusses the policy implications of the
asset-based approach in greater detail.
Before delving into the policy discussion, it is helpful to briefly review the
evolution of social policy approaches in Latin America over the past decades. This helps
put the asset-based approach into a historical perspective.
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 See Székely and Hilgert (2001).
6 This result is obtained by using the CASEN household survey for 1992, and multiplying all incomes by
1.3 to simulate the growth rate registered between 1992 and 1996. The poverty rate computed after this
adjustment can be interpreted as the poverty that would have been observed had the distribution remained
unchanged between the two years. Obviously, this is only a simulation for illustration purposes, since there
is no guarantee that growth would have been the same under a static distribution.5
Evolution of Social Development Strategies in Latin America and the
Caribbean
Although the experience with social policy has varied widely from country to country,
Latin America’s social strategy can be broadly classified into four phases:
7 (i) Import
substitution, (ii) the debt crisis of the 1980s, (iii) the structural adjustment packages of the
mid to late 1980s, and (iv) the incipient recovery of the 1990s.
The first phase covers the period between the Second World War and the late
1970s. These were the “golden years” of Latin America in terms of economic growth.
The industrial sector in most countries was growing vigorously, fueled by the import
substitution development strategy that prevailed in those decades. During these years, the
urban middle classes were expanding.
8 All kinds of subsidies were granted for industrial
production under the belief that industrialization was the best engine for growth.
This first generation of social policies was characterized by the widespread
provision of subsidies to goods and services open to the whole population. Its main
beneficiaries were the expanding middle classes. Some of these subsidies?like those to
food consumption?were justified as an indirect subsidy to industrial sector wages. Since
high growth rates financed these widespread subsidies to consumption, there was a
virtuous circle: on the one hand, the middle classes contributed to economic growth by
joining the industrial sector and migrating from rural areas. On the other, the policies that
were introduced to facilitate the import substitution process contributed to improving the
standard of living of vast sectors of the population by guaranteeing low prices for basic
goods and by supplying subsidized services.
In essence, the social strategy and the wider development strategy were one and
the same. And the same was true for the rural sector. In the spirit of the import
substitution strategy, rural areas played the key role of providing primary goods and
natural resources for industrial production at low prices, as well as low-cost goods for the
consumption of the expanding middle class. This implied in many cases subsidizing rural
production. But it also implied land redistribution, since high priority was given to
                                                       
7 Obviously, all countries did not follow the same strategy, nor were they exactly synchronized. This
characterization is made for purposes of simplifying the discussion.
8 See, for instance, Székely (1998) for a description of the case of Mexico.6
minimizing idle resources and the underutilization of land. Again, social policy was seen
as a fundamental part of the overall development strategy.
In spite of the large declines in poverty and inequality that accompanied this
development strategy, at some point it proved unsustainable.
9 During the late 1970s and
early 1980s, declining international oil prices triggered the debt crisis that pulled Latin
America into a deep recession. Thus began the second phase of social development
policies.
Under the new macroeconomic constraints of the early 1980s, widespread
subsidies to goods and services were simply prohibitive. Governments had to cut all
expenditures?especially in social areas, which were not a priority at the time?in order
to reduce public deficits. With escalating inflation rates, devaluation, and GDP declines,
the policy priority was to stabilize the economy at all costs. It was hoped that once the
macroeconomic situation was under control, growth would resume, and with it the
expansion of the middle classes and the social development of past decades. People
would have to endure some sacrifices in order to return to the “glory days,” perhaps at the
cost of substantial declines in living standards. The sacrifice, however, would only be
temporary and would not discriminate by each person’s position in the social ladder.
Everybody would have to pay for the “excesses of the good old days.”
Consequently, the second phase began by dismantling the previous social
development strategy. It coincided with an identity crisis of the State, where it was
unclear whether the government’s role should go beyond “setting the rules of the game,”
and perhaps intervening only when markets failed. In this context, widespread subsidies
and social policies in general became an obstacle to growth, rather than a powerful
engine of development as in the past.
Growth, however, did not resume immediately. Latin America went through a
period of economic reform, intense volatility and stagnation that lasted for nearly the
entire decade, and this prolonged the population’s sacrifice well beyond initial
expectations. The previous social strategy of providing widespread subsidies open to the
population at large proved to be financially unsustainable. However, signs were
                                                       
9 See Londoño and Székely (2000) for evidence on poverty and inequality trends for Latin America during
the 1970s.7
appearing that the shift to the opposite extreme of dismantling the previous system and
minimizing the role of the State could also be unsustainable from the social point of view.
Toward the end of the decade there was increasing evidence of growing inequality, and
most worrying, of substantial increases in poverty.
10 This marks the end of the second
generation of social policies, and the start of the third.
The third phase began with the acknowledgement  that structural adjustment
programs and economic reform could impose greater burdens on the poor. It was
recognized that the poor generally have fewer means of protecting their incomes from
unexpected shocks, or from the erosion of liquid assets entailed by high inflation. They
were also the most disadvantaged in terms of their chances of engaging in the sectors of
activity with higher productivity and higher probability of surviving external competition.
The policy solution was the introduction of compensatory policies through the
implementation of safety nets. In a set of influential papers, Ravi Kanbur (1985, 1987a,
1987b) started the development of what became the feasible alternative for introducing a
safety net: targeting resources to the poor.
The concept of targeting is quite simple. It suggests that when budgets are limited
in times of economic hardship, the policy problem is how to allocate scarce means in
order to obtain the largest possible poverty reduction per peso spent. Since there are
administrative costs of finding the people who are most in need, the population is
generally classified into subgroups according to some characteristic (geographic location,
gender, schooling, etc.). To target specific subgroups it is necessary to have the guidance
of poverty maps or poverty profiles, which identify the population with the highest
poverty rates and that which is most sensitive (in terms of poverty reduction) to fund
allocations. If one finds the subgroups that will generate higher poverty declines per unit
of the budget spent, then one should allocate the funds to these units until there are others
where the marginal peso would produce greater poverty reduction.
This third generation of policies has two important features. The first is that they
entail a totally different way of distributing resources. In fact, they entail new “costs,”
since to find the poor, one has to look for them. So, there has to be a balance between the
                                                       
10 One of the documents that best articulate the worries that adjustment programs were causing excessive
social distress, is the book by Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987).8
administrative costs that need to be incurred to find the target population, and the benefits
of finding the poor. Under this framework, the policies of the first generation were
inducing high “leakage,” since many of the non-poor or the not-so-poor were benefiting
from resources that should have perhaps been allocated only to the poorest of the poor.
Most of the gains from targeting originate precisely in reducing leakage. However, this
comes at a cost. Since finding all the poor would be too costly, almost inevitably, some of
the poor will be “missed.” Thus, the main challenge is to find a balance between
administrative costs, leakage, and under-coverage.
The second, and perhaps most important feature, is that there is a deep change in
the spirit of social policy. Under the targeting generation, policies aimed at increasing the
standard of living of the poor or at protecting them against the unfavorable
macroeconomic environment are compensatory, and they have to be small, specific and
tightly focused. The development strategy of countries in terms of growth might well be
totally disconnected from these social policies. More often than not, social and macro-
economic goals in the third generation of social policies were not part of an integrated
strategy, and they were regarded as having opposite objectives. Perhaps due to the
profound scars of the lost decade of the 1980s, the main objective of governments was to
keep tight budgetary controls; thus, social programs, although perhaps necessary, were a
potential threat to public deficits and to macroeconomic stability. Social policies and a
country’s growth strategy became two separate things; they were opponents challenging
each other for public resources.
The early 1990s mark a shift in the macroeconomic environment in Latin
America. On the one hand, the first years of the decade witnessed the recovery of positive
economic growth in most countries in the region. Economic performance was far from
spectacular—with the sole exception of Chile—but in general governments could afford
to start looking beyond the objective of macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, the
worldwide trend towards globalization became apparent during the middle of the decade.
The economic reforms implemented in the 1980s implied opening up Latin American
economies and exposing them to world markets; during the 1990s this was combined
with similar trends in other regions of the world. Globalization made it clear that to
survive in today’s world it is necessary to be competitive.9
This change in the economic environment had crucial consequences for social
policy, mainly because it implied that if a country wants to be competitive, having large
sectors of the population living in poverty could be a strong disadvantage. This is so
because those at the end of the social ladder are not usually endowed with means for
being “productive” in the terms of the new economic order. For instance, if poor families
have limited means to finance the education of their children and large sectors of the
population live in poverty, then the country will have limited human capital endowments
and may not be able to attract investment in order to finance development. To be
competitive, countries must have some natural resources, or human, physical, or other
factor endowments that enable them to produce goods and/or services at relatively low
cost. Having an army of unskilled workers with low wages does not necessarily do the
trick. First of all, workers need to have at least some minimum skills (such as the ability
to read or write) and must be physically able to engage in economic activity. Secondly,
the awareness of human rights triggered by the access to information in the new economy
imposes some restrictions on the use of labor, such as minimum standards in working
hours and wages.
These developments were accompanied by a fourth generation of social policies.
Programs such as  Progresa in Mexico,  Bolsa  Escola in Brazil, or  Chile  Joven in
Chile
11?all of which are a centerpiece in the social development strategy of their
respective  countries?have shifted away from the concept of only having temporary
safety nets to compensate the poor. These programs, which are being replicated across
the region, have one important element in common: they provide assistance to the poor,
but by including strong incentives to the accumulation of human capital. The spirit of
                                                       
11 Progresa is the Spanish acronym for the Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion (Education,
Health and Nutrition Program). The program provides cash transfers and a nutritional supplement to
families in extreme poverty in rural areas. Cash transfers are conditioned on children’s school attendance
rates of at least 85%, and regular attendance at health clinics for checkups and follow-ups. The cash
transfer is given to the mother, who also has to attend a series of talks and courses on health practices.
Bolsa Escola is a similar program that provides scholarships for disadvantaged children. Part of the cash
transfer is held in a special account, which the beneficiary can access after completing a schooling cycle.
Chile Joven is also a program of cash transfers, but in this case they are provided to young adults as a
training incentive. A detailed description and evaluation of the  Progresa program can be found at
www.ifpri.org/country/mexico.htm. A description of the  Bolsa  Escola program can be found at
http://www.mec.gov.br/home/bolsaesc/default.shtm.10
these programs is that they help the poor, but they do so by equipping them with the tools
that will allow them to help themselves in the new economic environment.
The fourth generation of social policy continues to use targeting mechanisms to
allocate resources, but it has two key features that distinguish it from the previous
generation. The first is that in some way it aims at attacking the causes of poverty, and
not only its consequences (low incomes). If one of the reasons why the poor are poor is
because they have scarce human capital, then helping them to improve their human
capital endowments by supporting investments in schooling or health (as in the case of
Progresa) may improve their situation well beyond the operation of the program. Even if
these programs are discontinued in the future, they might improve the standard of living
of their beneficiaries for a long time because they improve income-earning capacities
permanently.
The second key feature is that these types of programs are not totally
disconnected from the overall development strategy, as is the case of traditional targeted
safety nets. These new policies can even be viewed as actions that contribute to some
extent to economic growth in the long run. For instance, it is normally agreed that
education is an important requirement for faster GDP growth, and if these programs
contribute to increasing education levels, then in some sense they may be fueling the
economic system with resources that are useful for expanding production and
competitiveness.
12
But still, the fourth generation policies are normally viewed as a separate set of
programs aimed at specific subgroups of the population that need assistance from the
State and that are a cost to the economic system. These programs still have to compete
fiercely for public resources and have not been institutionalized in any country so far. In
many ways they are still viewed as a necessary cost that society has to pay for
compensating the disadvantaged.
Besides, these types of programs also entail some risks. Perhaps the main danger
is confusing the implementation of a program of this type with the full social policy
strategy of a country. These programs definitely have the capacity to improve the well-
being of the poor, but they cannot be regarded as a solution to the poverty problem. For
                                                       
12 See Birdsall, Pinckney and Sabot (1998).11
instance, they may contribute to improving schooling levels among poor children, but if
there are no opportunities to put human capital to work, they might not have the expected
impact on the income-earning capacity of individuals. Relying on these programs as the
full social strategy of a country is like throwing the poor a lifesaver that may keep them
temporarily afloat but doing nothing about the storm that is drowning them.
Where To from Here?
The main limitation of the fourth generation of social policies described above is that
programs such as Progresa or Bolsa Escola do not change the economic environment or
the underlying elements in the structure of the economy that are causing poverty. Having
low human capital endowments is certainly one of the reasons why the poor have low
incomes, but this is not the whole story. The factors generating poverty are “in the
system” since they are deeply rooted in the functioning of the economy. If the forces that
are generating poverty are not dealt with, these policies will always be swimming against
the tide, or will have a much smaller impact than expected.
In the case of Latin America, it seems that poverty is due not so much due to the
insufficiency of resources to satisfy each individual’s basic needs as to inequalities in the
distribution of such resources. Londoño and Székely (2000), for example, estimate that if
Latin America had the same income as it actually does, but with the income distribution
of any other region of the world, poverty would be cut by at least one half. If Latin
America had its same income but with the distribution of Asian countries instead of the
Latin American distribution, the poverty rate would be around 10 percent of what it
actually is.
13
If poverty is to a large extent the consequence of high inequality, the natural
question to ask is why is there so much inequality. Part of the reason is that individuals
are different in many dimensions: schooling, age, gender, regional location, occupation,
                                                       
13 Of course, this does not apply to the same extent to all countries. There are cases where GDP per capita
is low, and income redistributions would have a lesser impact. In any case, since the average income in all
Latin American countries is well above international and country-specific poverty lines, it could be argued
that poverty is to a large extent a problem of inequality, and not one of insufficiency of resources. This
exercise is only performed for the sake of illustration, since there is no guarantee that if the distribution of
resources were to be modified, the level of income would remain the same.12
sector of activity, etc. But these characteristics typically explain only about one third of
income differentials.
14
Furthermore, in countries with high inequality, inequalities are reproduced at all
levels. Table 1 illustrates this. The table includes the Gini inequality index for household
per capita incomes for 19 countries?17 from Latin America, plus Thailand and Taiwan.
The first column presents the index at the national level, while the second column shows
the average  Gini coefficient obtained from estimating inequality within each of the
smallest geographic areas that can be identified in the corresponding household survey.
In Argentina, for example, the overall Gini is .493. The average Gini coefficient from all
28 states is .467. The third column presents the standard deviation of the Gini coefficient
for each state. The fifth column indicates the smallest geographic area that can be
identified in each country, while the last presents the number of geographic units
identified.
Table 1.
                                                       
14 See, for instance, Chapter 1 in  Attanasio and  Székely (2001). The chapter reports a set of  Mincer
regressions for several countries, which were used to estimate the returns to schooling. In none of the cases
reported did the R-square in the regression exceed 27 percent. See also IDB (1998) for comparisons across
countries.
Inequality in Latin America and East Asia by Geographic Area
Country Year Gini Average Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Geographic Number of
Total Gini of all Gini of all as a % of Average Identifyer Geographic
Population Geographic Geographic for Geographic Identifyer
Areas Areas Areas
Argentina 1998 0.493 0.467 0.029 6.1 State 28
Bolivia 1999 0.601 0.586 0.049 8.3 State 9
Brazil 1997 0.585 0.569 0.032 5.7 State 27
Chile 1998 0.559 0.536 0.033 6.1 Region 13
Colombia 1999 0.555 0.530 0.032 6.0 State 25
Costa Rica 1998 0.461 0.437 0.022 5.1 Region 7
Ecuador 1998 0.557 0.564 0.015 2.6 Region 3
Guatemala 1998 0.562 0.494 0.076 15.4 Region 8
Honduras 1998 0.585 0.555 0.055 9.9 Region 18
Mexico 1998 0.538 0.488 0.045 9.3 State 33
Nicaragua 1998 0.602 0.546 0.061 11.2 State 17
Panama 1999 0.563 0.533 0.034 6.4 Province 9
Peru 2000 0.569 0.410 0.021 5.1 State 7
Paraguay 1998 0.493 0.508 0.071 14.0 State 16
El Salvador 1998 0.559 0.543 0.045 8.3 Región 5
Uruguay 1998 0.439 0.409 0.026 6.2 State 19
Venezuela 1999 0.467 0.444 0.030 6.7 State 23
Taiwan 1996 0.285 0.262 0.021 7.9 City 45
Thailand 1998 0.516 0.463 0.018 3.8 State 5
Average 0.526 0.492 0.038 7.6
Source: Author's calculations using household survey data.13
There are two interesting features from the table. The first is that there is a very
high correlation of .97 between the overall  Gini index and the average  Gini of the
geographic areas within each country. The second is that, on average, the standard
deviation of the Gini within each country is only 7.6 percent of the average Gini. The
highest standard deviation is for Guatemala, with 15.4 percent, and it is lower than 10
percent in 16 out of 19 countries.  This means that in countries with high inequality at the
aggregate level, large inequalities are also found in each region, state, municipality or
city. In countries such as Brazil, which are among the most unequal in the world, the
inequality is reproduced in each of the 27 areas into which the country can be
disaggregated. The standard deviation of the Gini by state is not even 6 percent in this
country. In contrast, in countries such as Taiwan, which have much lower inequality, low
inequalities are also found in each city in the country.
To some extent these inequalities reflect differences in personal characteristics,
but typically, around two-thirds remain unexplained after accounting for them. The other
two-thirds reflect aspects of the economic environment where individuals live—aspects
that are deeply entrenched in the system and reproduced at all levels. The reason why
Brazil, Chile, Mexico or Colombia is so unequal is not due to regional differences. In
each region or state, very high inequalities are also found. Similarly, the main reason why
Taiwan or Uruguay has the lowest inequalities among the countries in the table is not that
there are low regional differences. Even in each city or state within the country, there are
low inequalities.
If inequality, and therefore poverty, in Latin America is deeply entrenched in the
economic system, as Table 1 suggests, it is highly unlikely that the poverty problem will
be solved unless some fundamental elements of the system are not modified. Again,
specific programs such as Progresa or Bolsa Escola can certainly do much good, but the
forces generating inequality will limit their impact.
The Asset-Based Approach: A Fifth Generation of Social Policies?
The main policy implication of the asset-based approach to poverty reduction is that the
solution to the poverty problem must go well beyond income. It is necessary to look into14
the determinants of income to be able to identify those that are prone to change through
policy action.
15
Chapter 1 of  Attanasio and  Székely (2001) suggests a way to organize the
discussion. It states that the income of each individual in society is the product of five
elements. First of all it depends on the income-earning assets owned by each household
member. Broadly speaking, assets are classified into human, physical, and social capital.
Second, it depends on the rate of use of the assets, since assets only generate income
when they are put to work in the market. Third, on the production side of the economy,
income-earning assets are viewed as factors of production. The extent to which they
generate income depends not only on the ownership and the rate of use of the asset, but
also on the price paid for factors of production. Depending on the extent to which factors
are demanded and supplied, prices can be high or low, and depending on the degree of
trade openness of each country, the prices will be set by internal forces or by international
markets. The fourth element is the income received independently of income-earning
assets. It includes transfers (public or private), gifts, etc. that individuals receive not
because they are putting an asset to work, but because of other factors. The safety nets of
the third generation of policies would enter into this category. Finally, each person’s
income depends on the size of the household where the individual lives and on the way in
which resources are shared within the household. For simplification purposes it is
assumed that household resources are added up and that each individual’s access to
resources is the same.
From the policy point of view, there is scope for public action on all five fronts,
and several examples are given in the chapter. The emphasis here is that the main
implication of the asset-based approach is that it leads to a different policy strategy, and
to a different way of thinking about social policy than the second, third and fourth
generation policies. It means that social policies are not separate from the overall
development strategy; on the contrary, they are at the heart of it. On the one hand, their
main objective is to improve the standard of living of the poor, but on the other, they can
                                                       
15 Poverty is a multi-dimensional concept that includes aspects of culture, freedom, democracy,
empowerment and others. To make the concept tractable from a policy point of view, the analysis is
restricted to income poverty. As will be seen later, this scheme can be easily adapted to more
comprehensive definitions of poverty.15
do so in a way that contributes to growth, to increasing the productivity of factors of
production, and to improving factor allocation in the economic system.
To simplify the discussion, the items listed above can be reframed into two broad
policy categories: (a) the  capabilities that individuals have to obtain resources (all
income-earning assets), and (b) the opportunities available for putting income-earning
assets to work (including the rate of use and prices). In this scheme, the role of social
policy is to generate income-earning capabilities and to create opportunities for using
them productively.
16
There are four types of capabilities that are clearly prone to policy action:
education (formal schooling as a proxy for human capital), health, investment capacity,
and housing and basic services.
17 Education can be thought of as a measure of the human
capital or skills that an individual can offer in the labor market, or which can be used to
create his or her own employment. Health refers to the mental and physical capacity to
perform economic activity. Investment capabilities are the own possibilities that
individuals have for creating their economic activities through means other than their
labor. Housing and basic services are measures of the availability of basic infrastructure
to operate in society.
In terms of opportunity, the two clear areas of intervention are employment
opportunities and investment opportunities. Employment opportunities refer to the
conditions, costs and incentives in the labor market that influence the prices paid for
different kinds of labor and the demand for skills. Investment opportunity is given
basically by the existence of an efficient financial market that gives access to credit.
Credit can be used to create economic activity and to take advantage of the economic
environment to generate income.
                                                       
16 The concept of capabilities employed here is not exactly the same as that pioneered by Amartya Sen
(1985, 1987, 1989). Sen defines capabilities as the ability to achieve. This concept includes what are here
called capabilities (income-earning assets in the present scheme), but it also includes the opportunities to
put them to work. For the present purpose, the concept of capabilities (income-earning assets) is separated
from opportunities to simplify the policy discussion. In Sen’s framework, capabilities are a means to attain
functioning, or living conditions. In the present scheme, income plays the role of functioning because the
definition of poverty is restricted to income poverty.
17 Social capital is not included here because it is a more elusive concept.16
Creating Capabilities
(i) Policies for Human Capital Accumulation
In the case of education, there are at least two clear ways in which public policy can
support the accumulation of skills by individuals. On the one hand, to be able to invest in
the education of its members, a household has to be able to afford the private costs of
schooling. Even when access to public schools is available, households need to finance
private costs such as books, clothing, nutrition, and perhaps most importantly for poor
households, the opportunity cost of sending their children to school instead of sending
them to work. If households lack the means to finance even these basic investments, it is
most likely that they will under-invest in human capital. Programs such as Progresa or
Bolsa  Escola, which provide direct financial support to households conditioned on
investing in the education of their members, are perhaps one of the best policy options on
hand to enhance human capital accumulation by the poor. But even these could be
complemented with school supplies, meals, and transportation services for students to
make the effect stronger.
18
But on the other hand, to make investment in schooling an attractive option for a
household, services of a certain quality have to be available. As discussed in IDB (1996
and 1998), resource allocation in the schooling systems of most Latin American countries
is shaped by payment commitments to large bureaucracies, and not by the level and
quality of educational results. Higher income families may have the chance to escape to
private schools where competition and standards for quality are in effect, but the poor are
basically stuck with the public system, and when it is of low quality, differences in
human capital are intensified. The government can play a decisive role if it devotes at
least part of its efforts to generating information, setting quality standards and assuring
that schools receive funds from public resources based on the quality and quantity of the
education they provide, instead of focusing only on bureaucratic and budgetary controls.
19
                                                       
18 In the case of the Progresa program, a key issue is that by definition, some of the poorest of the poor do
not have access to its benefits because they live in isolated and remote areas where no school or health
clinic exists. If the program were accompanied by supply-side efforts, or by support for temporary
reallocation (during the school year) or subsidies to transport costs, it could perhaps reach these sectors of
society.
19 This will be even more of a challenge than before for Latin America in the future, as a result  of
demographic factors. Chapter 1 of Attanasio and Székely (2001) shows that the main bottleneck for the
poor appears to be in their low chances of enrolling and going beyond secondary schooling, and IDB17
There is also scope for introducing new ways of teaching for the disadvantaged.
Education by television is the prime example of an innovative way to reach the poor in
remote areas, and it has not yet been exploited to its full potential.
20
An additional problem is that many of the poor are already beyond school age and
will not benefit from improvements in the standard schooling system. They are the ones
who dropped out early because their families could not finance the investment any
longer, or those who never went through more than a couple of years of schooling due to
low quality of public schools and pressing household financial needs. For these
individuals training policies may be one of the only ways to reverse the disadvantage they
face in the labor market. But here too there are problems of investment capacity, and
there are problems of supply of training services since it is normally more costly to train
individuals the lower their schooling level. From the investment side, one option could be
to create Progresa-type programs for training. If one of the reasons why the poor that are
beyond school age do not continue their schooling is due to pressure to make ends meet
at home, direct incentives in the form of cash transfers conditioned on training might be a
feasible option.
On the supply side, the problem is that in Latin America technical education and
training programs, and especially those targeted to the poor, became obsolete decades ago
(see IDB, 2000). Some countries are beginning to experiment with different
organizational approaches to introduce incentives to improve their operation. There are
some recent experiences where the private sector has created its own training centers paid
by payroll taxes, but the quality of this option is not always good, and these facilities are
difficult to monitor. Perhaps the scope for action is in redefining the role of the
government as regulator of the system rather than focusing on providing the service. If
this is combined with income-support programs, there might be better chances for the
poor to acquire the training they would need to increase their income-earning power for
the rest of their working life.
                                                                                                                                                                    
(2000) estimates that to meet the demographic challenge of a changing age structure over the next 10 years,
the number of teachers in secondary schools will have to increase from 1.8 million to 2.6 million just to
keep pace with higher demand.18
(ii) Policies for Improving Health
As with schooling, there are two main reasons why the poor usually have more
precarious health capabilities than the rich.
21 The first is that they have fewer means for
investing in health to at least maintain their income-earning capacity. The second is that
they normally lack appropriate health insurance and therefore end up having access only
to lower quality public services open to the whole population.
In this case, too, there are two ways of thinking about which public policy could
improve the situation. First of all, governments can provide families with direct income
support to finance health services. The Progresa program is a good example, but even
actions of this type fall short of the needs of the poor because they do not normally
include support for medication or preventive services for infants. Expanding income
support to include these items may have a strong impact on improving, or at least
maintaining the precarious income-earning potential of the poor.
On the supply side, governments have usually ignored private health insurance
markets by seeking instead to support the poor by building and financing hospitals to
provide high-cost treatment directly. The problem is similar to that of public education in
the sense that efficiency is low, and in the end it is not clear whether the objective is
providing health services or supporting the huge bureaucracies that have grown up
around them. As in the case of schooling, perhaps the main challenge is to find ways of
creating effective regulatory frameworks that guarantee access of the poor to basic health
services. IDB (1996) discusses this thoroughly by acknowledging that resources for
spending in the health sector are limited, and that potential improvements could be
achieved by enhancing efficiency. To do so, it proposes a set of measures to change the
organization of public health services. These include increasing the autonomy of local
providers, building mechanisms of accountability through information, empowering
consumers through choice, and allocating resources on the basis of outcomes instead of
on the basis of budgetary needs. These are deep changes, but they have the potential to
benefit the poor, or at least to improve their access to health services.
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 As discussed by IDB (2000) there are already several examples of success in the region. The program
Telecurso in Brazil and Telesecundaria in Mexico are among the most notable.
21 These are reflected in higher infant mortality, lower life expectancy and being more prone to disease. For
some examples, see IDB-RES (2000), which illustrates this clearly for the case of Mexico.19
(iii) Investment Capabilities
In the absence of formal credit markets, one can finance economic activity either by
saving, or by having access to informal credit markets. But if incomes are too low and
access to banks to place saving deposits does not exist, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
create savings for own investment. In these cases savings must be done in a non-
monetary form (building materials, livestock, etc.) or by holding cash. But both of these
strategies are risky. They tend to have a lower return and incur high transaction costs in
many instances, such as converting illiquid assets into cash. The problem is worse in a
context of economic uncertainty where savings can only be used as a buffer-stock to face
unexpected shocks, and where savings cannot be used in long-term ventures with at least
medium-term maturity periods. Moreover, if the poor are not able to save they will be
more exposed to fluctuations in the economic system and, worst of all, they will be
unable to accumulate the income-earning assets that could lift them out of poverty.
With respect to access to informal sources of credit, the family or other networks
may be a good source of resources, but for the poor these resources are limited due to the
poverty of the people in their networks. When these resources are restricted, people have
to turn to informal credit markets that charge huge prices for credit. This reduces the
profitability of investment or makes it prohibitive altogether.
There are at least two areas for policy action in terms of creating savings
capabilities. The first and perhaps most obvious is promoting the existence of small-scale
financial institutions that provide the poor with safe ways to save through liquid savings
accounts, and which yield some return even when the investment is low. These can be
promoted by setting the rules of the game in ways in which some regulation and
supervision is introduced, at the time that guarantees to investors are provided. The
second is by creating insurance mechanisms such as unemployment insurance or own-
insurance through social security accounts, which reduce the risk of abrupt income
declines. Schemes of this type could allow the poor to invest with longer-term objectives
?such as accumulating income-earning  assets?and have access to investments with
higher yields, which would make their savings and investment more profitable. A stable20
macroeconomic environment could also be thought of as an important contribution to
reducing risk for the poor.
(iv) Housing and Basic Services
Housing, basic infrastructure, and services such as electricity, potable water, and drainage
are necessary for functioning in modern societies. Without them the human capital and
health of individuals are severely undermined. Moreover, the chances of creating
economic activity are crippled. This is especially so in the case of women. Latin
American women have traditionally been responsible for domestic chores, and with
inadequate electricity, water, etc., they end up spending a huge amount of time and effort
in these activities.
Although the poor, especially in urban areas, may have some access to housing
and public services, most of the poor rarely have them in adequate quality and quantity.
In part this is because the priority for governments has been to keep prices and tariffs low
in the hope that this will provide widespread access (see IDB, 1998). The result is that the
wealthy and middle classes, which consume the most, have received subsidized services
while the poor in rural and marginal urban areas have very limited access, if any.
Since electricity, potable water, drainage and basic infrastructure are usually
publicly provided, there is a clear role for the State in covering the deficits accumulated
in the past by the poor. But in the case of housing there is also scope for helping to create
both financial markets and a regulatory framework that is suitable for the poor. One
example of the limitations of current regulatory frameworks is that in most countries,
public or private mortgage options are only available for “finished” housing, defined as
units that have been completely built and that have access to basic services. One of the
reasons is that the house itself is normally the collateral, so it has to have some minimum
value to make it worthwhile for banks or other creditors to engage in the deal. The
problem is that the poorest of the poor either do not have access to these mechanisms,
because they are employed in the informal sector, or they do not meet the minimum
requirements to qualify for a loan for the full price of a house. Either a regulatory
framework promoting the financing of “unfinished” units, or the creation of a market for21
“unfinished” housing could improve the chances of the poor to acquire housing of
acceptable quality as well as access to services.
Generating Opportunities
(v) Employment Opportunities
Opportunities, as defined here, are about prices and about the chances for using assets to
generate income flows. From the point of view of the rate of use of assets such as human
capital, Chapter 1 of  Attanasio and  Székely (2001) shows that the main difference
between rich and poor is found in the labor force participation of women. Practically all
males in prime age, regardless of their social position, work and are income-earners,
while in the case of women, the participation rate among those who have better
opportunities due to their education is much higher than among those who have less
schooling.
One reason for this outcome is that traditional mechanisms for protecting labor in
Latin America were designed by men, for men. Their objective was to generate formal
employment with benefits, and with guarantees of stable jobs. But this implicitly induces
discrimination against women, on the one hand because these mechanisms impose higher
implicit costs for hiring women (due to maternity leave and allowances), and on the other
because, by restricting employment to full time and limiting flexibility in hours, these
restrictions makes employment a prohibitive venture for some women. These efforts at
protection result in reality in much lower participation rates among poor uneducated
women.
There are at least four ways in which public policy can contribute to reducing
restrictions to female participation. The first is through providing access to basic
infrastructure and services that lower the cost of household chores and free some time for
women (see discussion of housing and services). The second is through enhancing child
care services and preventive health services that create a network of support for females
who wish to engage in the labor market, but who do not do so because of the restrictions
imposed by household tasks. These services could either be subsidized by the State or
promoted through appropriate tax incentives, or other schemes, for private firms. A
fourth way is by socializing maternity costs. If rather than charging these costs to22
employers they are financed through fiscal revenue, the incentives to hire women would
improve, and with it, their opportunities.
The fourth way is through labor legislation. As argued by IDB (1998), labor
protection laws and regulations end up favoring individuals who are able to participate in
the formal sector?who are normally those that are endowed with some schooling and
health?while leaving the rest uncovered. There are at least two types of actions that
could contribute to improving labor market opportunities for poor women. The first is
introducing greater flexibility into contracting conditions in order to allow for part-time
or temporary workers who have to deal with household tasks as well as labor market
activities. But this must be accompanied by the corresponding (proportional) benefits
enjoyed by full-time workers. The second action is unemployment protection to stabilize
workers’ income if they temporarily lose their jobs or are transiting between jobs. Many
countries have already established individual savings accounts that can be used as
personal unemployment insurance, but the main limitation is that this is restricted to the
formal sector of the economy. For those in informal employment, it could be possible to
establish collectively financed social safety nets that could play the role of social
insurance. Individual savings accounts could possibly be expanded to cover these groups.
But apart from the differences in labor force participation between rich and poor
individuals, the poor also face the strong disadvantage of receiving lower remuneration to
the precarious human capital that they own. As illustrated in Chapter 1 of Attanasio and
Székely (2001), in Latin America the returns to primary and secondary schooling are
relatively low, while the returns to higher education are huge. Perhaps the most
straightforward option would be to influence the level of the minimum wage in the hope
that by increasing it, the returns to the assets of the poor would increase. The problem is
that high minimum wages often result in even more discrimination against women with
low education, and unskilled workers in general, so in the end they do not serve their
purpose of redistributing income.
In an era of globalization it is difficult to think of policies that promote higher
wages and employment for the poor without referring to trade policy. Since most Latin
American countries are now open to international trade, their wages are set not only by
the internal supply and demand for labor, but also by the scarcity or abundance of23
different types of labor in world markets. Therefore, minimum wages have an even more
limited role than before.  Perhaps the best example of this situation is the entry of China
and India into world markets. These are the two most populated countries in the world,
and when they started opening up to trade more than a decade ago, the availability of
unskilled labor in the world increased substantially. Latin America is not an unskilled-
labor abundant region any longer, at least by world standards, and thus, it is not clear that
it has the comparative advantages that attract investment and generate demand for local
labor.
This means that to improve the wages of the poor it is necessary to have a trade
policy that promotes the use of the human capital owned by them. According to the IDB
(1998), one way of dealing with this is to advocate flat and moderate tariff structures that
protect all sectors alike and that do not privilege imports of capital in industrial activities
that are normally complementary to skilled labor. Tariff structures that favor intermediate
inputs or factors of production that are complementary to relatively unskilled labor (by
Latin American standards) would have better chances of increasing the demand for the
labor of the poor.
(vi) Investment Opportunities
It has been known for a long time that efficient financial markets are one of the main
vehicles for social mobility. Financial markets provide the institutional framework with
which savings are mobilized to finance investment ventures. For individuals with low
savings capacity they often are the only way of accessing resources to create economic
opportunities. But unfortunately, it is well known that Latin American countries have
inefficient and small financial systems that result in credit scarcity. This considerably
inhibits the opportunities of the poor and reduces their capacity to put their meager
income-assets to work. Therefore, reform to create or to improve the functioning of
financial markets in Latin America could be one way of enhancing the income-earning
capacity of the poor.24
One way to do this is to promote lending institutions that make micro loans.
22 The
role of the State in this case might be to create the regulatory framework for them to
flourish. This requires setting clear rules of the game, imposing restrictions on the use of
financial resources by banks for investing in certain instruments, monitoring the
operation of banks, and creating guarantees that reduce the risk of their investment.
But the problem is that micro lending institutions are so far only a minuscule part
of the financial sector in Latin America. Altogether, they do not account for even 1
percent of the credits provided by commercial banks to the whole economy. This points
to the need for policies that generate widespread access to credit for the population. The
option of creating and managing state-owned banks that provide subsidized credit is not
the solution, at least as judged by their low rate of success and high inefficiency in the
region. To know where there is scope for intervention, it is first necessary to identify the
obstacles that impede the credit relationship.
According to IDB (1998), “the fundamental problem lies in the first step in a
credit relationship: the creditor must give the borrower money based on a promise of
repayment.” The credit relationship therefore depends on the ability to repay loans and
the willingness to repay. The question is what can policy do to ensure ability and
willingness to pay. Apart from introducing appropriate regulation and supervision of
banking institutions, there are at least four mechanisms that governments can use to
create or expand competitive and efficient financial systems that reach the poor:
punishment, collateral, reputation and relationships.
Punishment is basically about the effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing
the law. While enforcing the law does not necessarily benefit creditors on a case-by-case
basis, it does provide incentives to debtors to repay if they possibly can. For financial
systems that serve smaller borrowers, there need to be additional ways of ensuring
willingness to pay. Areas for improvement include operational restrictions of banks (in
terms of flexibility of times and forms of operation), simplification of documentation
requirements, and lowering capital requirements on loans.
                                                       
22 There are many examples of this in Latin America. Perhaps the most successful are the Banco Sol and
Caja los Andes in Bolivia and the Banco del Pacífico in Ecuador. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is
perhaps the best known case in the world of successful micro lending for the poor.25
Collateral is one of the key mechanisms that make financial systems work
because they imply some guarantee of repayment. The problem in the context of poverty
reduction is that the poor normally lack collateral. One option is the introduction of new
financial products such as leasing and factoring, or at least creating the regulatory
framework so that they can exist. These types of instruments are closer in spirit to the
concept of “renting” capital, rather than selling it. For instance, in leasing the lending
institution normally retains ownership of the equipment or other form of capital, while
the debtor pays a monthly rent (which includes interest and amortization) for its use and
eventually becomes an owner. One way in which public action can promote these types
of arrangements is by facilitating the parties to repossess the leased equipment at rapid
and low cost in case of default. Tax schemes tailored to the needs of these schemes, and
the elimination of regulatory barriers, are also areas where public policy can intervene to
facilitate the creation and expansion of formal credit in the economy.
Reputation can be an effective mechanism for lowering the costs of monitoring
ability and willingness to repay loans. One of the strongest advantages of reputation in
the context of poverty reduction is that anybody can develop a good reputation,
regardless of his or her socioeconomic condition. One feasible policy for introducing
reputation mechanisms into the financial system is the creation of credit bureaus. These
information-sharing mechanisms concentrate credit histories that are made available to
creditors. By sharing information with creditors they impose high risks from default by
limiting future access to credit to those with a bad history. Credit bureaus are a rare
commodity in Latin America. Interestingly, among the few places they are found are
where small banks providing micro loans operate. In these types of institutions, credit is
provided progressively in larger loans to an individual or group, with default resulting in
loss to access. Rates of repayment of micro loans are usually very high, to a large extent
due to this set of arrangements. Creating public credit bureaus on a larger scale could be
one of the policy alternatives for providing incentives to create and expand credit markets
in the region.
Promoting  relationships is another important way to promote the creation of
financial institutions. For instance, one common credit mechanism is group lending,
where default by one member of the group results in loss of access to credit for the entire26
group. These schemes take advantage of the relationship that borrowers have with each
other by introducing self-monitoring mechanisms that dramatically reduce the cost of
monitoring lending. One way in which public policy can promote the use of group
lending is through fiscal incentives to entities or groups that provide these types of loans.
Additionally, there is scope for policy intervention in setting the regulatory framework, or
even creating insurance mechanisms that reduce the risk of default.
Social and Development Policy: One and the Same
It is time to start thinking about new ways of designing social policies in Latin America.
We need policies that support the poor in a way that by doing so they contribute to
growth and are themselves engines of growth and development. This can only be done if
social policy is at the heart of the development strategy of a country, rather than an
opponent constantly competing for public resources that may undermine macroeconomic
stability. Therefore, the solution is not compensatory measures, but policies that promote
efficiency in the economic system and that improve the productivity of the poor.
If we go beyond income, and ask what determines the income of each individual,
it is possible to outline some of the elements of such a strategy. This discussion has been
framed in terms of policies that generate capabilities and create opportunities. The idea is
that by creating capabilities and opportunities for the poor, their incomes will be higher
and this will give them access to a better standard of living.
But when we start thinking about what is needed to improve capabilities and
opportunities, we end up talking about cash transfer programs such as Progresa or Bolsa
Escola, health policy, incentives for saving, housing and basic services, labor market
regulations, trade policy, the introduction of credit bureaus to expand access to credit, and
even about the promotion of alternative financial instruments such as leasing to avoid the
restrictions imposed by lack of collateral by the poor. We end up talking about the
economic environment as a whole. And what is most interesting is that many of these
items are rarely conceived of as part of social policy. They are normally viewed as part of
the overall development strategy of countries.
The purpose of this paper has been to outline a scheme where the various public
policies can be viewed as part of this integrated strategy. By framing it in this way, it is27
obvious that programs such as Progresa are an important part of the strategy, but they
cannot be regarded as  the strategy for poverty reduction. If other elements of the
economic environment are not modified, these types of government intervention will
always be swimming against the tide. But, on the contrary, if they are complemented by a
wide set of policies that generate capabilities and create opportunities for the poor, their
chances of contributing to solving the poverty puzzle may be multiplied.28
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